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Abstract 
  A thorough analysis of the Concentrating Solar Thermal Power (CSP) development in Spain in 
the period 1998-2013 has been carried out in order to identify the main drivers behind the bubble-like 
behaviour exhibited by this renewable technology. Tending a parallelism with the basic principles of 
the control systems theory has facilitated the identification of the main shortcomings in the design of 
the various control frameworks governing the CSP deployment in the studied period. The CSP 
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disorderly proliferation propitiated by inefficient control mechanisms has resulted in an overrun cost to 
the electricity system that has tried to be mitigated with the application of retroactive measures 
seriously harmful for the investors. It is expected that the conclusions drawn from this comprehensive 
review of the Spanish case have a general relevance for other countries undertaking the development 
path of renewable technologies.  
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1. Introduction 
 After the first initiatives undertaken by the United States in the 80s, the CSP industry was 
virtually stopped until the mid 2000s. Since then, the worldwide CSP installed capacity has 
experienced a great expansion due to the application of incentive mechanisms. Specifically, during the 
five-year period 2008–2013 the CSP installed capacity around the world increased near 50% per year 
on average [1]. 
 By the end 2013 Spain was the world leader in cumulative CSP capacity, accounting for over 
67% of the global total. Out of the 3,425 MW of worldwide cumulative CSP capacity in 2013, 2,300 
MW corresponded to Spain, followed by the United States of America (USA) with 882 MW. The rest of 
the installed capacity was mainly located in countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region and India [1]. 
 Nevertheless, the Spanish figures for 2012 were even stronger. In 2012 Spain accumulated 
more than 76% of the world’s CSP capacity. That year, the Spanish cumulative CSP capacity 
increased by more than 95% compared to 2011. In fact, over 950 MW of the 970 MW installed in 2012 
worldwide, were brought into operation in Spain [2,3], making double the number of facilities from one 
year to the next, from 20 in 2011 to 44 in 2012 [4].   
 The loss of momentum that the Spanish CSP figures for 2013 are beginning to reflect are due 
to recent drastic changes in its policy for the promotion of renewable energy sources (RES). These 
changes have made unfeasible to build new CSP plants on Spanish soil beyond the end 2013. The 
CSP cumulative capacity was limited to a maximum of 2,520.7 MW [5], which should come into 
operation before the end 2013 to be eligible for the feed-in-tariff (FIT). As a result, Spain is soon 
expected to pass the baton of CSP global leadership to the USA, which by April 2015 had 1,700 MW 
in operation and 1,770 MW in various stages of construction and development [6]. 
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 Despite the prominent global role of Spain in the CSP deployment, there are few references 
addressing the various aspects of its development in the context of its national energy policy. Thus, 
the effect of several variables on the cost of electricity from CSP is analysed in [7] in order to guide the 
design of the economic incentives. Also, in [8] the CSP figures are considered in the general 
framework of electricity from RES for the assessment of the benefits and costs of the RES deployment 
in Spain between 2002 and 2011 or for the estimation of the resulting support expenditures in 
Germany and Spain over the period 2010–2020 in [9]. In [10] the Spanish case alongside other 9 
countries is taken as a benchmark to analyse the CSP energy market in 8 Arab countries. In [11] the 
specific regulatory framework that led to the CSP Spanish leadership (Royal Decree (RD) 661/2007) is 
compared to the national incentive programs of 5 CSP emerging countries and some lessons are 
extracted. So far, however, there are no specific studies on the performance of CSP in Spain in the 
whole period encompassing from its beginnings to its runaway expansion and the complete closure of 
the sector. 
 Comparatively, the number of references analysing the CSP deployment in the context of the 
national energy policy of those countries currently having operational CSP plants is much more 
significant. As relevant examples, [12] considers the USA case and [13] refers to the overall MENA 
region. Particular countries of the MENA region are specifically looked at in other references, such as 
Algeria in [14], Egypt in [15] and Morocco in [16]. The case of India has received substantial attention 
in [17-19] and the case of Australia has been assessed in [20]. Likewise, China has received 
considerable attention in [21-24] and the case of Thailand is considered in [25]. 
 Even the assessment of the CSP potential in the energy policy framework of countries that at 
present have no commercial CSP plants has received comparatively more attention in the literature. 
This is the case of Brazil [26], Chile [27], Cyprus [28], Malaysia [29], South Africa [30], Turkey [31] and 
Zimbabwe [32]. 
Following this gap, this paper follows the thread of the performance of the CSP sector in Spain 
from its beginnings to the present day. Firstly, the different energy policy targets applied to the 
Spanish CSP sector are identified and then, based on public data, the policy results are evaluated. 
From this comparison, the bubble-like behaviour exhibited by the CSP sector is clearly evidenced 
(Section 2). Next, in search of the causes of such behaviour, the paper precisely describes and 
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synthesizes all the different regulatory and economic frameworks that have governed the Spanish 
CSP (Section 3). Following the recent works [33,34], the paper then draws on basic control theory 
principles to analyse the Spanish CSP regulatory and economical frameworks. Under this approach, 
the inefficiencies in the several legal frameworks that gave rise to the CSP bubble are identified. It is 
also highlighted how each of the successive regulatory changes tried to correct the inefficiencies of 
the previous frameworks, thus showing the causal relationship between the subsequent stages 
(Section 4). Also, the interaction of the Regions or Autonomous Communities (AACCs) and the State 
in the CSP promotion is examined in search of potential causes for the asymmetrical distribution of the 
CSP facilities across Spain (Section 5). Finally, all the factors deemed relevant for the evolution of the 
Spanish CSP sector during the period of analysis are duly systematized and conclusions are raised 
(Section 5). 
 
2. The Spanish CSP energy policy, objectives and results 
 In 1999 it was issued the first renewable energy (RE) plan (PER) that established specific 
targets for the CSP in Spain, namely, the PER 2000-2010 [35]. It set the goal of reaching 200 MW of 
installed capacity by 2010. 
 This plan was reviewed in 2005 by the PER 2005-2010 [36]. It raised the previous 200 MW 
capacity target to 500 MW by 2010.  
The cumulative capacity targets set in the different PERs for the CSP in Spain have been 
represented in Figure 1 in red dashed line. Also, the evolution of the cumulative installed capacity has 
been plotted in blue solid line and the annual installed capacity has been shown using green solid line 
columns. Complementarily, the period covered by the different PERs and legal rules has been marked 
off. 
FIGURE 1 
At first glance, the evolution of the CSP cumulative installed capacitive appears to be close to 
its targets, thus misleading into thinking that the implemented energy policy worked properly. 
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Nevertheless, this impression vanishes when it is considered the fact that the 2,299.5 MW in operation 
at the end 2013 (see Figure 1) were developed in the context of an energy policy designed to reach 
only 500 MW. In other words, with a target of 500 MW in force, the CSP sector was allowed to embark 
on installing 4.6 times more cumulative capacity than planned1.  
A set of actions (that will be accurately detailed in the following sections) were taken to 
address this failure of the CSP energy policy. First, the allowed overcapacity was forced to enter into 
operation in several phases until the end 2013. In Figure 1 it has been represented in blue dotted line 
what could have been the possible evolution of the cumulative capacity without this imposed delay. By 
this deferral mechanism, the technical and the economic impact that the concurrent entry into 
operation of this excess capacity would have entailed for the Spanish electricity system was mitigated 
to some extent.  
Then, the new CSP capacity targets for the period 2011-2020 were aligned with the capacity 
currently under development. Thus, in November 2011 the PER 2011-2020 [37] established stepwise 
increasing capacity targets of 3,001 MW by 2015 and 4,800 MW by 2020, respectively. The new 
capacity targets were adapted after the event to acknowledge the bubble-like behaviour exhibited by 
the CSP sector. 
The allowed excess over the 500 MW initial capacity target resulted also in a proportional 
excess over the planned cost to the electricity system (and therefore on the taxpayer). In order to 
reduce this impact a series of retroactive cutbacks in the granted incentive system were applied. 
These retroactive measures, however, might have compromised the viability of the CSP plants in 
operation and have created a climate of legal uncertainty with devastating effects on the credibility of 
Spain as a destination for international investment.  
 
 3. Description of the 1998-2013 economic and regulatory 
frameworks for the CSP in Spain 
                                                     
1 If the 2,520.7 MW maximum authorized capacity is taken as a reference instead of the 2,299.5 MW finally 
installed at the end 2013, then the 500 MW capacity target was exceeded in 5.0 times. 
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 3.1. The 1998-2004 subperiod: laying the ground of the Spanish CSP 
sector 
 As background to this initial 1998-2004 stage it is worth considering some policy milestones 
that prepared the way for the subsequent Spanish CSP energy policy. 
 Thus, in November 1997 the European Commission produced a White Paper for a Community 
Strategy and Action Plan for RE [38]. It raised the goal of covering 12% of the primary energy 
demanded in the European Union (EU) in 2010 with renewable energies. Unlike other more mature 
power generation technologies, no specific contribution was outlined for CSP. Nevertheless, it was 
counted among the minority renewable technologies that could offer significant potential in the future. 
In the belief that a least one of these technologies could be exploited commercially over the coming 
decade, a marginal contribution of 1 GW by 2010 was assumed for them. This 1 GW power goal by 
2010 at European level, although not exclusive for CSP, could be considered as a precursor of the 
targets set for CSP by the regulatory frameworks and energy plans to come. 
 In Spain, the generation facilities not exceeding 50 MW using as primary energy renewable 
energy, waste or cogeneration had been legally differentiated from the conventional technologies and 
had been integrated into a Special Regime (SR) to boost their promotion. The SR had been regulated 
since 1980 by different rules.  
 Nevertheless, the Electricity Sector Law 54/1997 of November 1997 [39] redefined the framing 
of the SR in a context of liberalisation of the activities of electricity production and commercialization. 
The Electricity Sector Law 54/1997 also incorporated the EU objective for renewable energies to reach 
12% of the demand for primary energy by 2010. To achieve this goal, the law made a commitment to 
establish a plan to promote renewable energies.  
 With this background in view, the beginning of the first analyzed stage 1998-2004 was marked 
by the enactment of RD 2818/1998 in December 1998 [40]. This RD elaborated the regulatory 
development of the Electricity Sector Law 54/1997 as regards the SR. In this framework, all facilities 
using solar energy as primary energy were classified in the group b.1, making no specific reference to 
photovoltaic (PV) or CSP technologies.  
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 The remuneration of the energy fed into the grid was based on the electricity pool price plus a 
premium, and additionally a complement for reactive energy. As long as the installed solar capacity 
did not exceed 50 MW, the premium for the facilities with rated power up to 5 kW was set to 36.0607 
c€/kWh. For facilities over 5 kW it was set to 18.0304 c€/kWh. Unlike other technologies, no annual 
update for the solar premiums was provided. 
 Alternatively, solar facilities could elect not to apply the pool price plus premium funding 
system but a full price to receive. Its initial value was set to 39.6668 c€/kWh for facilities up to 5 kW 
and 21.6364 c€/kWh for those beyond 5 kW. These initial values were approximately equivalent to the 
pool price plus premium system, and no provision was made for their annual update. 
 All the incentive systems were established without time limit, but it was envisaged a review of 
premiums and prices every four years. 
 In December 1999, in fulfilment of the commitment introduced in the Electricity Sector Law 
54/1997, the Plan for the Promotion of Renewable Energy for the period 2000-2010 (PER 2000-2010) 
was developed [35]. For the first time specific targets were established for CSP. By 2010 the goal was 
to reach 200 MW of installed capacity and 413 GWh/year of generated energy, corresponding to 2,065 
h/year of equivalent operation. 
  In December 2000, the RD 1955/2000 [41] modified the RD 2818/1998 by expressly including 
solar thermal power into group b.3, along with geothermal, wave, tidal and hot and dry rocks energies. 
As a result of this modification, it was precluded the possibility of considering solar thermal facilities as 
part of the group b.1 devoted to facilities using solar energy as primary energy. For the group b.3, the 
premium to add to the pool price was 3.2755 c€/kWh and the alternative full price to receive was 
6.7313 c€/kWh. Both the premium and the alternative full price to receive of group b.3 would be 
updated annually according to the change in the average selling price of electricity. 
 In August 2002 the RD 841/2002 [42] further modified the RD 2818/1998, repealing the 
amendment introduced by RD 1955/2000 that included solar thermal power in the group b.3. In turn, 
the group b.1 was subdivided into two subgroups, namely, b.1.1 for plants using PV solar energy as 
primary energy, and b.1.2, for plants utilizing solar thermal energy as primary energy to generate 
electricity. This newly created group b.1.2 was granted a premium of 12.0202 c€/kWh, with no annual 
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update mechanism. Unlike PV facilities in group b.1.1, the CSP plants in group b.1.2 could not elect to 
receive an annually updatable full price as an alternative to the pool plus premium funding system. 
Also, RD 841/2002 specifically declared that fuel could be used to maintain the heat storage 
temperature during periods of interruption of electricity generation.  
 By 2004, six years after the regulatory development of the SR, there were no commercial CSP 
plants in operation or in the construction stage in Spain [3]. 
 In order to facilitate the assessment that will be carried out in the Section 4, it has been 
summarized in the Table 1 how the different regulatory changes in the subperiod 1998-2004 affected 
the power target, the funding system and other characteristics of interest. 
TABLE 1 
 
 3.2. The 2004-2007 subperiod: the CSP projects became bankable. 
 In March 2004, the entry into force of RD 436/2004 [43] repealed the previous RD 2818/1998 
and RD 841/2002. It introduced two alternative remuneration options indexed to the average electricity 
tariff (AET) of each year. On the one hand, a CSP plant selling electricity to a distribution company 
would receive a regulated tariff consisting of a 300% of the AET for the first 25 years since its start up 
and 240% thereafter. On the other hand, a CSP plant selling electricity freely in the market would 
perceive a premium plus an incentive on top of the electricity pool price. The premium was 250% of 
the AET for the first 25 years since its start up and 200% afterwards, and the incentive was 10% of the 
AET for the whole lifetime of the plant. In both cases, the percentages to perceive were adjusted to 
80% of their initial values after the first 25 years. Regardless the selected energy selling option, all 
CSP facilities would also receive a complement for reactive energy. The selected selling option should 
be maintained for a minimum period of one year. The AET for the year 2004 was 7,2072 c€/kWh. 
 A review of the tariffs, premiums, incentives and complements defined in RD 436/2004 was 
announced for the year 2006. Also, every four years starting from 2006, a further review would take 
place. The reviews would come into force on 1st January of the second year after that in which the 
revision was made. Additionally, the revisions would not have retroactive character since they would 
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not apply to facilities in operation prior to their entry into force. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a review 
would take place also when the CSP installed capacity reached 200 MW. This de facto put at 200 MW 
the power limit to qualify for the economic conditions initially set by RD 436/2004. 
 The RD 436/2004 specified the type and quantified the use of fuels to maintain the heat 
storage temperature. CSP facilities receiving a regulated tariff could use either natural gas or propane 
to that end only during periods of interruption of electricity generation. The annual fuel consumption 
should be less than 12% of their electricity production. However that percentage would increase to 
15%, and without time limitation of fuel use, for CSP facilities selling energy to the market. 
 In order to improve the operation of CSP plants, the subsequent RD 2351/2004 of December 
2004 [44] amended the more strict provisions on fuel use initially made by the RD 436/2004. While 
keeping the same fuel percentages, the RD 2351/2004 allowed the utilization of any fuel type. 
Besides, the requirement of fuel usage only during the periods of interruption of power generation was 
eliminated. Instead, it was allowed the fuel use to maintain the temperature of the heat transfer fluid to 
compensate for the lack of solar irradiation that could affect the planned delivery of energy. 
 In August 2005 it was published the Renewable Energy Plan in Spain 2005-2010 (PER 2005-
2010) [36]. Several factors advised the review of the previous plan for the period 2000-2010. On the 
one hand, the pace of development of some RES was significantly lower than necessary to achieve 
the 2010 targets. On the other hand, due to the sustained increment in primary energy consumption in 
the period 2000-2004, RES targets had to be further increased to meet the goal of covering 12% of 
the primary energy demand in 2010. The PER 2005-2010 also incorporated two indicative objectives 
set for Spain by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, namely, reaching 
29.4% of electricity generation from RES (Directive 2001/77/CE) [45] and using 5.75% biofuels in 
transport by 2010 (Directive 2003/30/CE) [46].  
 Regarding CSP, the PER 2005-2010 stated that the 200 MW power limit of RD 436/2004 was 
a barrier to the development of the sector. Even more, some AACCs in Spain had already modified 
their own goals of CSP capacity for 2010 to an aggregate of 405 MW. So, the new CSP power and 
energy targets for 2010 were established at 500 MW and 1,298 GWh/year, respectively, 
corresponding to 2,596 h/year of equivalent operation. 
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 In June 2006, the Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 7/2006 [47] was issued in order to align the 
remuneration of RES under the SR to the actual evolution of their cost. The rise in oil prices was 
increasing the AET, and through it, the remuneration of RES was also augmenting without direct 
justification. Consequently, the Royal Decree-Law 7/2006 established that the future revisions of the 
AET would not apply to the remuneration of RES under the SR. It was also announced a forthcoming 
reform in the remuneration of the SR facilities.  
 In March 2007 started its commercial operation the first CSP facility in Spain, a 11.02 MW 
central receiver plant with 0.5 h of thermal energy storage capacity [3,48]. 
 The presented regulatory changes in the analysed subperiod 2004-2007 have been 
summarized in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
 3.3. The 2007-2009 subperiod: the speed-up of the Spanish CSP sector 
In May 2007 the RD 661/2007 [49] entered into force, which repealed the previous RD 
436/2004. The RD 661/2007 definitely decoupled the remuneration of the SR of the AET used so far. 
Otherwise, the basic structure of the regulation of the SR remained largely the same. 
 As with the RD 436/2004, facilities could perceive a regulated tariff or alternatively the 
negotiated pool price plus a premium. Whatever the remuneration option, it was reduced to 80% of its 
initial value after the first 25 years of operation of the CSP plant. The regulated tariff for the first 25 
years was 26.9375 c€/kWh and 21.5498 c€/kWh thereafter. The premium for the first 25 years was 
25.4000 c€/kWh and 20.3200 afterwards. As a novelty, the sum of the market price plus the premium 
was bounded between an upper limit of 34.3976 c€/kWh and a lower limit of 25.4038 c€/kWh. 
Regardless of their energy selling option, the facilities would also receive a complement for reactive 
energy. The selected option should be maintained for a minimum period of one year. 
 An annual update of the tariffs, premiums, complements and upper and lower limits was 
established. This would be done according to the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) minus 
25 basis points (BPS) until 31 December 2012, and 50 BPS thereafter. Also, it was anticipated a 
review of the remuneration framework in 2010 that would apply those plants brought into operation 
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from January 1, 2012. From that moment, new revisions would take place every four years, ensuring a 
reasonable profitability. Facilities entering into operation prior to 1st January of the second year after 
that in which a revision was made would be unaffected.  
 An additional mechanism was also established to determine the period of maintenance of the 
regulated tariffs and premiums. Once reached 85 % of the power target of a technology, a period of 
not less than one year would be set during which properly registered facilities could still qualify for the 
premiums and tariffs. 
 The RD 661/2007 incorporated the indicative target for Spain, already included in the PER 
2005-2010, that at least 29.4% of gross electricity consumption in 2010 should be generated with 
RES. In this line, the capacity targets established for the different RE technologies coincided with 
those previously set by the PER 2005-2010. For the case of CSP, it was 500 MW. However, future 
increases were allowed in the power objectives, provided this would not compromise the safety and 
stability of the system and whenever necessary. Moreover, the commitment to start in 2008 the 
elaboration of a new plan for renewable energies for the period 2011-2020 was set. The new 
objectives of this plan would condition the next revision of the remuneration framework planned for 
late 2010. 
 The RD 661/2007 allowed the possibility of hybridization of various fuels and/or technologies. 
It also required all the SR facilities larger than 10 MW to be ascribed to a generation control centre, to 
ensure at all times the reliability of the electric power system. On the other hand, the previous 
regulations only demanded a guarantee of 2% of the budget of the facility to request access to the 
transmission network, but not for the distribution network. The RD 661/2007 required guarantees to 
process the access both to the transmission network as well as to the distribution network. For the 
CSP case, these guarantees were 20 €/kW. 
A 49.9 MW parabolic trough facility with 7.5 h of thermal energy storage capacity was the 
second CSP plant to enter commercial operation in Spain in December 2008 [3,47]. 
 The modifications experienced in the subperiod 2007-2009 in the capacity target, the funding 
system and other relevant characteristics have been summarized in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3 
 3.4. The year 2009: the boom of the Spanish CSP sector 
 In April 2009 the Council of the EU adopted the climate-energy legislative package [50]. It was 
a set of binding legislation that established the overall EU environmental goals for 2020 known as the 
"20-20-20" targets, namely, a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels, a 20% 
improvement in the energy efficiency and a 20% share of RES in the EU's final energy consumption. 
The Directive 2009/28/CE [51] of March 2009, included in the climate-energy legislative package, 
specifically set for Spain a minimum 20% share of RES in its national final energy consumption, 
coincident with the overall target for the entire EU.   
 In May 2009 the RDL 6/2009 [52] entered into force, which introduced important changes in 
the access to the remuneration of the RD 661/2007. These changes were justified by the growing 
impact that the remuneration of SR was having on the tariff deficit, i.e., the lack of incomes of the 
electric system to cover all its expenses. It was argued that this imbalance could put at risk the short-
term sustainability of the electric system, both economically and technically. Thus, an emergency 
measure for the planning of non-PV2 RE facilities was implemented. 
 In order to qualify for the economic framework of RD 661/2007, the enrolment in a Register of 
Pre-Allocation of Remuneration (RPAR) managed by the central Government became compulsory. In 
turn, to obtain the registration in the RPAR a number of demanding requirements ought to be met. 
Among other conditions, it was required a connection point to the electrical network, resources to 
undertake at least 50 % of the project investment, a purchase agreement for a minimum of 50% of the 
value of the equipment and a new guarantee of 100 €/kW for the CSP case. 
 Registrations would be accepted in the RPAR while the power objective of a technology was 
not attained. Thereafter, in order not to lose the entitlement to the pre-assigned remuneration, projects 
would have 36 months to be completed and to start selling energy. 
 Nevertheless, ongoing projects meeting all the requirements at the entry into force of the RDL 
6/2009 should apply for registration in the RPAR within 30 calendar days and deposit the guarantee 
                                                     
2 PV technology had a specific own procedure, laid down by Royal Decree 1578/2008 of 26 September, 2008. 
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within 30 additional calendar days. In case that the projects registered in this way did not cover the 
power target, the economic framework of the RD 661/2007 would be maintained until the target was 
achieved. Conversely, if the power target was exceeded, the remuneration of RD 661/2007 would be 
applied to all the registered projects, but would not be extended beyond. In the latter case, restrictions 
on annual implementation and start up of the registered facilities could be established in order not to 
compromise the technical and economic sustainability of the electric system. Also, a new legal and 
economic framework was announced for projects not qualifying for the remuneration of the RD 
661/2007. 
 Prior to the entry into force of the RDL 6/2009, 3 CSP plants with an aggregate installed power 
near 81 MW were commercially operating in Spain. By the end 2009, the RPAR for the CSP 
technology was closed down and 56 projects amounting near 2,340 MW3 obtained the corresponding 
registration from a total of 104 applications totalling 4,499 MW. The entry into operation of the 
registered facilities was distributed in 4 phases until the end 2013, the first about 880 MW and near 
500 MW the following ones [53,54]. 
 The changes introduced by the RDL 6/2009 have been summarized in the Table 4. 
TABLE 4  
 3.5. The 2010-2013 subperiod: the bursting of the Spanish CSP sector 
In the 2010-2013 subperiod, a set of new regulatory elements that restricted the entitlement or 
reduced the remuneration of the CSP facilities under the RD 661/2007 was issued.  
To start with, by the end 2010 three new regulations were enacted in this regard. Thus, the RD 
1565/2010 [55] entered into force in November 2010. It established additional technical requirements 
for the SR facilities and redefined the concept of substantial modifications of installations that would 
entail losing the entitlement to the remuneration of the RD 661/2007. On the other hand, it set the 
possibility of granting a specific economic framework to innovative CSP projects for an aggregate total 
of 80 MW. That call was finally resolved in favour of a 49,90 MW facility that extended the RPAR to 57 
CSP projects totalling near 2390 MW.  The premium and upper and lower limits for the selected facility 
                                                     
3 The last published update of the RPAR included 58 CSP projects amounting near 2440 MW [5]. 
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fell by 15% compared to the RD 661/2007 levels and it ought to start selling energy between January 
1, 2014 and July 1, 2015 [56]. 
 Subsequently, the RD 1614/2010 entered into force in December 2010 [57]. It set limits to the 
number of equivalent operating hours at rated power eligible for the remuneration of the RD 661/2007 
(see Table 5). Also, the more advantageous pool price plus premium remuneration option was 
eliminated for a period of 12 months. The operational CSP plants would perceive the regulated tariff 
from January 1, 2011 and the facilities under construction since their date of commissioning. However, 
during this period the percentage of power generation from fuel associated to the regulated tariff could 
rise from 12% to 15%. Additionally, the planned revision of the economic system anticipated in RD 
661/2007 was delayed by two years, so that instead of January 1, 2012, it would apply to new 
installations brought into operation from January 1, 2014, onwards. 
TABLE 5 
 In December 2010 it was also issued the RDL 14/2010 [58], establishing urgent measures to 
correct the electricity sector tariff deficit. It obligated all power producers to pay a toll of 0.5 €/MWh for 
the energy fed into the transport and distribution networks, from January 1, 2011 onwards. 
 During 2011, no new rules affecting the remuneration of CSP plants under RD 661/2007 were 
issued. Rather, the Law 2/2011 of March 2011 [59] transposed into the Spanish legislation the energy 
objectives of the Directive 2009/28/CE and, as previously did the RD 661/2007, set up the elaboration 
of a RE plan for the period 2011-2020 (PER 2011-2020). The PER 2011-2020 [37] was approved in 
November 2011 and established as non-binding CSP capacity and energy targets 3,001 MW and 
8,287 GWh/year by 2015 and 4,800 MW and 14,378 GWh/year by 2020, respectively. 
 The year 2012 brought the end of the FIT system for the new facilities of the SR and also 
introduced further cuts to the remuneration of the facilities eligible for the economic framework of the 
RD 661/2007. 
 Thus, the RDL 1/2012 of January 2012 [60] temporarily suspended the procedure of 
registration in the RPAR and suppressed the economic incentives of the RD 661/2007 for the new 
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facilities of the SR. This measure would not affect neither operating plants nor those already inscribed 
in the RPAR. 
 On the other hand, the Law 15/2012 of December 2012 [61] introduced a new 7% tax on the 
gross revenues of all electricity producers and cancelled tax exemptions for the energy products used 
in the electricity generation. Additionally, the FIT was suppressed for the percentage of electricity 
generated with fuels in certain RE plants. In the case of CSP facilities that meant a cumulative fall in 
revenue between 19% to 22% (7%+(12% to 15%)), besides new taxes to the energy products 
employed to warm up the heat-transfer fluid. 
 Also, the RDL 29/2012 of December 2012 [62] excluded from the economic framework of RD 
661/2007 the plants that were not fully completed before the deadline or with elements not reflected in 
the implementation project. It was explicitly defined when a facility could be considered as fully 
completed and when not. 
 In 2013, new regulatory measures reduced the remuneration of the SR facilities. Thus, the 
RDL 2/2013 of February 2013 [63] replaced the CPI for the annual update of the remuneration of all 
the electricity sector activities by a more stable index. It was the core inflation at constant taxes, i.e., 
the CPI at constant taxes excluding energy prices and unprocessed food. This change meant a drop 
around 3% in the remuneration for 2013 [64]. Also, the premium on top of the electricity pool price was 
set to 0 €/kWh and its upper and lower limits were removed, turning the hitherto less attractive 
regulated tariff into the only profitable remuneration option. For the CSP technology, the regulated 
tariff for 2013 was around 10% lower compared to the premium plus pool price for 2012. Both 
measures applied retroactively from 1 January 2013 and resulted in a new 13% decline in the CSP 
remuneration. 
 In July 2013 the RDL 9/2013 [65] came into force, which adopted urgent measures to 
guarantee the financial stability of the Spanish electricity system. It repealed the prevailing RD 
661/2007 and the RPAR mechanism of RDL 6/2009 and modified the Electricity Sector Law 54/1997 
to introduce the principles upon which a future new legal and economic framework for the SR facilities 
would be based.  
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 The former regulated tariff and premium on top of the pool price concepts were replaced by 
the pool price plus a specific remuneration compensating for the investment and operational costs that 
could not be recovered with the incomes from the sales of energy in the pool. This specific 
remuneration would vary according to the typology of the facilities and would be such that an efficient 
and well managed company could obtain a reasonable return of investment along its regulatory 
lifetime. The reasonable return was set, before taxes, at the average yield during determined period of 
the 10-year Spanish bonds in the secondary market plus an appropriate differential and the 
parameters of the specific remuneration could be revised every six years. The costs determined by 
rules not applicable to the entire Spanish territory (those set by the AACCs) or those not responding 
exclusively to the generation of electricity would not be considered for the calculation of the specific 
remuneration. To qualify for the new economic framework, the enrolment in a specific remuneration 
regime Register managed by the central Government became compulsory.  
 For the particular case of those SR facilities that were entitled for the FIT before the entry into 
force of RDL 9/2013, the average yield of the 10-year Spanish bonds would be calculated over the last 
10 years and a differential of 300 BPS would be added (amounting to 7,395%). While the future legal 
and economic framework was implemented, the remuneration of these SR facilities would be 
provisionally paid according to RD 661/2007 but it would be recalculated afterwards pursuant to the 
new regulation.  As an exception, the innovative 49.9 MW CSP project under the RD 1565/2010 
maintained its specific remuneration. 
 In December 2013, the Law 54/1997 was repealed almost entirely by the new Electricity 
Sector Law 24/2013 [66]. Recognizing the inability of the regulatory measures taken in the last years 
to eradicate the tariff deficit, the Law 24/2013 set as one of its basic purposes the recovery of the 
economic and financial stability of the electricity system. As novelties, it suppressed the SR concept 
and referred instead to production facilities with specific remuneration, regulated the temporary 
closure of production facilities and defined regulatory periods of six years. The percentage of 
electricity generated from fuels would not perceive the specific remuneration, but only the pool price. 
 The principles of RDL 9/2013 for the remuneration of the production facilities from RES were 
incorporated, although new elements intended to adjust the remuneration to the cyclic situation of the 
economy and to the electricity system needs were introduced. Thus, the new RE production facilities 
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would qualify for a specific remuneration only on certain exceptional basis established by the 
Government and it would be awarded by a competitive procedure. The average yield of the 10-year 
Spanish bonds for the first regulatory period of the new facilities would be calculated over the three 
months prior to the entry into force of RDL 9/2013 and a differential of 300 BPS would be added. 
Besides the review of the remuneration parameters at the beginning of the six-year regulatory periods, 
some of them could also be adjusted at the three-year half-periods.  
 The remunerations perceived by the existing SR facilities before the entry into force of RDL 
9/2013 would not give rise to any claims even if the reasonable return defined in the new economic 
framework for their regulatory lifetime was exceeded. 
By the end 2013 deadline, 50 CSP plants with 2,299.5 MW of aggregated capacity were 
commercially operating in Spain. 10 out of the 60 initially envisaged plants were finally withdrawn (two 
49.9 MW parabolic trough and eight dish Stirling plants totalling 71.39 MW), on the grounds of the loss 
of revenue due to the last regulatory changes. Likewise, the 49.9 MW innovative CSP project with 
deadline 1 July 2015 was also suspended [3]. 
 The regulatory changes affecting CSP in Spain in the subperiod 2010-2013 have been 
summarized in the Table 6. 
TABLE 6 
 3.6. Beyond the period 
 The new legal and economic framework for the production facilities from RES was finally 
regulated by the RD 413/2014 of June 2014 [67], which developed the basic principles already 
contained in RDL 9/2013 and integrated in the Law 24/2013. In turn, the remuneration parameters to 
be applied during the first regulatory half-period were approved by the Order IET/1045/2014 of June 
2014 [68].   
 According to the CSP Industry Spanish Association, the new regulatory framework posed a 
15% mean cut in the CSP remuneration, which added to the retroactive measures adopted in the 
previous years rose the cumulative cut to 50% [69]. 
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4. Analysis of the 1998-2013 economic and regulatory 
framework for the CSP in Spain 
 4.1. Applied methodology 
The performance of CSP in Spain in the studied period is here analysed under the perspective 
of feedback control systems. A parallelism is tendered between the economic and regulatory 
frameworks governing CSP and a simplified equivalent control scheme. The intention behind this 
approach is not to build an accurate model of the CSP sector, but rather to identify the energy policy 
elements inducing the fast expansion and subsequent stagnation of this market in Spain drawing on 
basic control theory principles.  
This methodology was recently applied in [32,33] to analyse the PV boom occurred in Spain in 
2008. It proved a useful tool to ascertain the causes that led the PV sector to instability and for 
assessing the measures intended to curb its unbridled behaviour. 
 4.2. Assessment of the 1998-2009 economic and regulatory frameworks 
for the CSP in Spain in control terms 
4.2.1. Initial control structure, FIT definition and delays  
In our approach, an analogy has been built between the regulatory frameworks governing 
CSP in Spain and the basic closed loop control scheme shown in the Figure 2.a. In this way, the input 
or set point to the control system is the CSP target applied by the several PERs, the system to be 
controlled is the Spanish CSP sector and the response or system output is the CSP capacity actually 
installed. The control block represents the diverse electricity sector rules and laws affecting CSP, 
enacted in order to hit its power target. The error signal applied to the control block is the difference 
between the set point and the system output. In turn, the output generated by the control block as a 
function of the error signal is the FIT that stimulates the response of the controlled CSP sector. This 
feedback mechanism allows adjusting the control action according to the system output results. 
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FIGURE 2 
 The review of the funding systems in force in the period 1998-2009 (see Tables 1-3) shows 
that in all cases the FIT value was independent from the evolution of the error signal. Consequently, 
the control scheme applied in practice was open loop (see Figure 2.b), without a feedback mechanism 
intended to adjust the control action to the system output evolution.  
 The decoupling of the FIT and the error signal in the period covered by the RD 2818/1998, RD 
436/2004 and RD 661/2007 can be observed in detail in the subplot corresponding to the probe 
labelled A in the Figure 2.b. In this subplot it has been represented the evolution of the two existing 
remuneration options. Thus, the regulated tariff is shown in blue solid line and the premium on top on 
the pool price in solid red line, along with its upper and lower limits in brown and orange dashed lines, 
respectively. For comparison purposes, it has been represented in the same subplot the evolution of 
the error signal in the same period, in yellow dotted line. 
In the subperiod 1998-2004 covered by the RD 2818/1998 the error stood at 100% (see 
Figure 2.b. probe A subplot).  Initially, the issuance of RD 2818/1998 aroused the interest of some 
companies in developing the first commercial CSP projects on the belief that the remuneration for the 
solar facilities was also applicable to the CSP technology [70]. Then the RD 1955/2000 classified solar 
thermal power into a different group, with economic incentives below 20% of the corresponding to the 
solar facilities. Although the RD 841/2002 reinstated the CSP into the group of facilities using solar 
energy as primary energy and raised the remuneration, it was still inadequate for accessing funding. 
This initial uncertainty in the control law to be applied and the inadequacy of the final stimulus level 
were responsible of the lack of response of the system. The ability of open loop control systems to 
accurately perform an action lies solely in its good calibration, which in turn requires a precise model 
of the controlled plant. And as shown by the facts, the implemented control law was far from being well 
calibrated. 
 With the RD 436/2004 in force in the subperiod 2004-2007, the control system continued 
running open loop. Nevertheless, its increased FIT levels triggered the system response out of its 
state of paralysis (see Figure 2.b. probe A subplot). By as early as the end 2004, three projects in 
progress totalling 110 MW could be identified, along with other initiatives in the development phase 
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amounting 325 MW. Therefore, not only the 200 MW capacity target of the RD 436/2004 but also the 
500 MW target of the PER 2005-2010 for the year 2010 were virtually assured without the need for 
any other additional stimulus measure [36]. 
Although open loop, the RD 436/2004 controller incorporated review mechanisms linked to the 
achievement of its 200 MW power target and other unspecified periodic adjustments. Nevertheless, 
the intrinsic delay of the implementation process of the CSP facilities did not allow testing the 
performance of these mechanisms because another ill-defined characteristic precipitated the end of 
the RD 436/2004 term. The control law depended on the AET, an external parameter linked to the 
rising oil prices, alien to the CSP controlled system and decoupled from the error signal. This 
shortcoming led to a regulatory intervention (RDL 7/2006) that froze the controller output and to the 
announcement of a forthcoming new control scheme, all of this when no CSP plant had been 
completed yet.  
The new control framework RD 661/2007 in force from 2007 maintained the open loop 
structure. Although the control law was disassociated from external parameters not directly related to 
the plant, it still failed to be linked to the error signal. Instead, as in the former control frameworks, 
periodic but unspecified adjustments were envisaged.  
Furthermore, the RD 661/2007 increased the control signal applied to the system when the 
error was decreasing. The new CSP tariff and premium were raised over 17% and 27% respectively, 
compared to the last updated values of RD 436/2004 (see Figure 2.b. probe A subplot). According to 
estimates by Government agencies, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of a standard 50 MW parabolic 
trough CSP project with an investment cost of 5,000 €/kW and 2,596 hours of operation per year 
would be about 9%-10% with the remuneration of the RD 436/2004. The RD 661/2007 would raise this 
figure to 11%-12% [71]. All of this when the PER 2005-2010 had appraised the 500 MW power target 
for 2010 as achievable without additional stimulus measures to those laid down by RD 436/2004 and 
had even anticipated a 10% decrease in the CSP cost of investment in 2008 and a 6% in 2009, 2010 
[36].   
 4.2.2. Pulse disturbance effect of the RD 661/2007 transition mechanism 
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Besides the above-mentioned periodic but unspecified adjustments envisaged for the FIT, the 
RD 661/2007 incorporated and additional review mechanism. A yet to be decided review would apply 
at the undetermined time of achievement of the 85% of the RD 661/2007 500 MW capacity target. 
From that moment on, the increased controller output would still be applied for an undefined period of 
not less than one year (see Table 3). All the uncertainty associated to the term of maintenance of the 
increased FIT could have contributed to generate a call effect of investment in the CSP sector. 
Companies should undertake investment decisions before the undetermined end of the propitious 
conditions. This could be likened to the application of a superimposed pulse signal to the system set 
point.  
When the figures of the CSP capacity requesting grid access are examined, a clear picture of 
the pulse effect of the RD 661/2007 is obtained. With a 500 MW capacity target in force, 4,100 MW of 
CSP capacity had requested access to the grid by 2007 [71].  By 2009, this figure had escalated to 
15,563 MW [37] (see Figure 3). 
FIGURE 3 
The main plot in the Figure 3 shows the sharp contrast between the size of the capacity 
requesting grid access by 2007 and by 2009 (in red bars), the cumulative capacity target (in red 
dashed line) and the cumulative installed capacity (in solid blue line). Due to the large difference in 
scale, the last two magnitudes have been represented again in a separate subplot to make them 
visible. The future Spanish CSP bubble was brewing. 
 4.2.3. New control structure: improving the open loop structure with a saturation mechanism  
 By means of the RDL 6/2009, new control measures were implemented that abruptly limited 
the growth of CSP bubble that was taking shape. Nevertheless, although new elements were added to 
the former control scheme, its open loop design was maintained. The interpretation in control terms of 
the resulting scheme is represented in the Figure 4. In this figure, the simple open loop control 
structure of the RD 661/2007 is delimited by a dashed red frame, whereas the joint control framework 
of RD 661/2007 and RDL 6/2009 is delimited by a dash-dotted blue frame.  
FIGURE 4 
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 Two different control actions can be distinguished in the measures introduced by the RDL 
6/2009. On the one hand, the total power limit established in the RPAR acted as a saturation block 
placed at the output of the system (see Figure 4, power limitation mechanism box). Regardless the 
magnitude of Pinvestment, i.e., the cumulative capacity of the CSP projects in the investment stage, the 
saturation mechanism limited the value of Pawarded, i.e., the cumulative capacity of the CSP projects that 
got the registration in the RPAR.  
 In the heat of the CSP bubble generated within the RD 661/2007 control framework, a 
Pinvestment of 15,563 MW had requested access to the power grid and had deposited the corresponding 
economic guarantees4 [37]. Due to the power limitation mechanism, below 30% of that Pinvestment 
applied for the RPAR, in view of the stringent conditions imposed. Finally, the value of Pawarded 
amounted to around 15% of Pinvestment. As these figures reflect, the saturation mechanism implemented 
in the RPAR contained the runaway trend of the system response (see Figure 4, power limitation 
mechanism subplot). Nevertheless, Pawarded represented almost five times the capacity target of RD 
661/2007. The CSP bubble and the associated overrun cost to the electricity system had been limited, 
but not avoided. 
 On the other hand, the orderly distribution of Pawarded  into 4 different phases deferred the cost 
to the electricity system of the fivefold exceeded capacity target. This cost deferral mechanism is 
interpreted in the Figure 4 by the implementation of 4 parallel branches following the RPAR saturation 
block. The parallel branches include own saturation blocks that limit Pawarded to the specific amount of 
CSP power allocated to every phase. After a delay, the Pawarded of a determined phase is converted 
into Pinstalled. While the phase 1 branch only includes the delay attributable to the implementation 
process of the CSP plants, the other branches incorporate additional delays accounting for their 
restrictions on annual start up (see Figure 4, cost deferral mechanism subplot). 
 In the Figure 4, it is also shown that the power limitation and the cost deferral mechanisms 
incorporated by the RDL 6/2009 were the first attempts to control the cumulative cost associated to 
the capacity target overshoot. Nevertheless, although the aim of these measures was the control of 
the cost to the electricity system, no cost target was established. Rather, the cost was indirectly 
                                                     
4 For the typical 50 MW CSP plant installed in Spain, the economic guarantees would amount to 1M€. This figure 
reduces significantly the possibilities of applications of speculative nature. 
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controlled through one of the variables involved in its calculation, namely, Pinstalled. The product of a 
limited and delayed Pinstalled by the mean operating time would render a limited and delayed amount of 
energy shed into the electricity system. In turn, the product of this energy by the FIT would also result 
in a limited and delayed cost. 
 4.3. Assessment of the 2010-2013 economic and regulatory frameworks 
in control terms 
When translating the regulatory measures of the period 2010-2013 into an equivalent control 
scheme, two different subperiods split by the RDL 9/2013 must be distinguished. While the set of 
measures prior to the RDL 9/2013 added new elements to the existing control framework, the RDL 
9/2013 dismantled the previous structure and addressed the problem with a new approach. 
4.3.1. New measures for the cost reduction prior to the RDL 9/2013 
 Analyzing first the regulatory measures prior to the RDL 9/2013 (see Table 6), two lines of 
action intended for the control of the cost can be identified. On the one hand, an upper limit was put on 
the number of equivalent operating hours at rated power. Only the energy produced within this ceiling 
would be eligible for the remuneration of the RD 661/2007. Putting a cap on the energy qualifying for 
the remuneration amounted to bounding the cost.  
 On the other hand, the introduction of tolls and taxes, the elimination of tax exemptions for the 
energy products, the cancellation of the more advantageous premium plus pool price funding system 
and the FIT suppression for the percentage of energy generated with fuels can be translated into an 
equivalent reduction of the actual or equivalent FIT received. Limiting the equivalent FIT, the cost to 
the electricity system was also limited.  
 The figure 5.a shows the interpretation in control terms of the two aforementioned cost 
reducing approaches applied to the RD 661/2007-RDL 6/2009 framework. The resulting scheme is 
delimited by a dotted green frame. Thus, the unbounded mean operating time that linked Pinstalled to the 
produced energy in the Figure 4 has now been replaced by a capped operating time (see Figure 5.a, 
remunerated operating time reduction mechanism box). Also, the different measures reducing the 
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actual FIT perceived are interpreted as a constant K less than the unity that multiplies the nominal FIT 
(see Figure 5.a, effective FIT reduction mechanism box).  
FIGURE 5 
4.3.2. RDL 9/2014 new regulatory approach 
Otherwise, the RDL 9/2013 put an end to the former open loop control of Pinstalled, where the 
cost problem was indirectly addressed by adding a series of concurrent saving measures. Instead, the 
foundations were laid for a new control scheme of closed loop nature with the cost to the electricity 
system as the controlled variable (see Figure 5.b). The remuneration parameters would be reviewed 
periodically, trying to reconcile a reasonable return of investment for the RE facilities with the 
economic sustainability of the electricity system. The Law 24/2013 elaborated more on the principle of 
adjusting the remuneration to the needs of the electricity system. 
5. The role of the AACCs in the CSP promotion in Spain 
As shown in Figure 6, almost all the Spanish CSP facilities have been located in the southern 
half of the country. In fact, three AACCs concentrate the 95.5% of the installed CSP power, namely 
Andalusia, Extremadura and Castile-La Mancha (see Figure 6). 
FIGURE 6 
Figure 6 also shows the average yearly direct normal irradiation (DNI) in the different AACCs 
in which the country is divided. It is apparent that the southern AACCs mainly concentrate the areas 
with the highest DNI levels, what makes them the best candidates for the implementation of CSP 
facilities. The importance of this issue is such that per each additional 100 kWh/m2 of DNI, a reduction 
in the levelized cost of CSP energy up to a 4.5% can be attained [73]. 
Nevertheless, a thorough analysis cannot fail to examine the role played by the AACCs in the 
uneven results obtained in the CSP promotion across the country.  
When the distribution of powers set by the Spanish Constitution [74] between the State and 
the AACCs is examined, it is found that the AACCs share powers with the State in areas related to RE 
deployment such as energy and environmental protection. Nevertheless, the AACCs also assume 
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exclusively other powers such as land planning, urban development and housing. This exclusive 
competence in land issues confers the AACCs the ability to modulate the pace of implementation of 
RE facilities in their territory. Additionally, the Electricity Sector Law 54/1997 deposited in the AACCs 
the power of granting the authorization to generation facilities under the SR, for which purpose the 
AACCs have developed their own administrative procedures. Moreover, the regulation of the physical 
connection of the facilities to the grid is also competence of the AACCs [75]. 
In the light of the foregoing, the intervention capacity of the AACCs in the implementation of 
RE facilities in their territory is evidenced. On the other hand, the economic framework for the 
remuneration of the SR facilities is competence of the State. Continuing the parallelism with control 
schemes, this deeper view at the state and regional levels is illustrated in the Figure 7. 
FIGURE 7 
In Figure 7, the simple control block of the RD 661/2007 framework previously employed in the 
Figures 4 and 5 is framed by a dotted blue line. Its inner structure is now revealed to a greater detail, 
showing a unique economic framework followed by a set of parallel branches corresponding to the 
control capacity of the different AACCs. Regulations of the physical connection to the grid and the 
administrative procedures for the authorization of RE facilities have been modelled as switches that 
introduce variable delays. In this way, the AACCs can signal the investors their willingness to host RE 
facilities in their territories [75], modulating the effect of the common remuneration. Likewise, in Figure 
7 the block representing the overall Spanish CSP sector is framed by a dotted red line. Inside, it is 
pictured a set of coupled regional CSP sectors, to convey the idea that the stimulus signals from 
particular AACCs can affect the investments decisions undertaken in all the territories. This control 
structure allowed the interested AACCs to compete for attracting investment in RE facilities, potentially 
contributing to the asymmetric deployment of some RE technologies in Spain. 
In a recent study, the authors evaluated the impact of the different administrative procedures 
and landscape policies in the uneven growth of the on-floor PV facilities across the Spanish AACCs 
[76]. It was found that those AACCs with a lower degree of complexity in their administrative 
procedures achieved better implementation rates. Likewise, the processing time associated with the 
administrative procedure could have conditioned the choice of the AACC where the facilities would be 
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located. Indeed, the bulky unexpected results of PV power installed in Spain could not have been 
possible without the existence of AACCs with high speed processing capabilities. In a similar vein, the 
existence of landscape protection policies in some AACCs could have added to the complexity of their 
administrative procedures. 
Similar conclusions were pointed out in [77], in search of the main reasons for the poor CSP 
deployment in the AACC of Catalonia (see Figure 6). On the one hand, although existing certain areas 
with adequate DNI levels, they are still lower than those of the southern AACCs. Also, the 
administrative procedure for the authorization of CSP facilities in Catalonia was perceived by the 
developers as longer and more complex than the procedures of other AACCs. Additionally, the 
structure of land ownership in Catalonia is mainly characterized by a large number of smallholders, as 
opposed to the dominance of large landholdings in the southern AACCs. This fact could have 
complicated the achievement of the large tracts of land needed by CSP facilities. 
In sum, the higher DNI levels of the southern AACCs along with their potential control capacity 
to compete for attracting RE investments in their territories can be held responsible for the uneven 
distribution of the CSP facilities in the Spanish soil. 
 6. Conclusions. 
This paper contributes an in-depth description of all the economic and regulatory frameworks 
governing the promotion of the CSP technology in Spain in the period 1998-2013. Setting a parallelism 
between well-established principles of feedback control systems and these legal frameworks has 
facilitated the identification of the drivers that ultimately led to the creation of a CSP bubble. Likewise, 
the same methodology has allowed analysing the several measures consecutively applied to limit the 
economic impact on the Spanish electricity system of the CSP unbridled growth.   
The open loop nature of the control schemes implemented in the RD 2818/1998, RD 436/2004 
and RD 661/2007 frameworks has been identified as a relevant factor in the runaway path followed by 
the CSP cumulative installed capacity. The FIT value not only was decoupled from the error signal, but 
was even greatly increased when the error began to decline.   
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Also, the transition mechanism introduced by the RD 661/2007, by which an unspecified FIT 
review would apply at the time of achievement of the 85% of the capacity target, could have acted as 
a pulse disturbance on the CSP sector. All the uncertainty associated to the term of maintenance of 
the increased FIT levels might have promoted a call for investment effect contributing to the creation 
of a CSP bubble.  
Likewise, the delay between 2 and 4 years associated to the implementation time of the CSP 
facilities hindered the control of the system. Monitoring exclusively the cumulative installed capacity 
kept fundamental information about the capacity in the investment state concealed.   
In order to amend the former control deficiencies, by means of the RDL 6/2009 a saturation 
mechanism was implemented that limited the FIT entitlement to only a 15% of the CSP capacity that 
had requested grid access. Even after this severe cut, the authorized capacity represented five times 
the 500 MW power target. Additionally, in order to delay in time the overrun cost that this excess 
would entail, the RDL 6/2009 introduced a deferral mechanism that distributed into 4 phases the entry 
into operation of the registered facilities until the end 2013. 
In the period 2010-2013, a set of measures intended to reduce the overrun cost to the 
electricity system of the CSP bubble was implemented. The operating time entitled for the FIT was 
limited and the actual FIT perceived was decreased by the introduction of new tolls and taxes and 
other retroactive changes in the funding system.   
Finally, in mid 2013 the RDL 9/2013 dismantled the RD 661/2007 control framework and its 
subsequent amendments and changed completely the control philosophy. The former open loop 
scheme was transformed into a closed loop scheme, and the cost to the electricity system replaced 
the cumulative installed capacity as the new set point.  
Also, the share of powers between the State and the AACCs in areas related to the RE 
promotion has been examined, manifesting the potential capacity of the AACCs to compete for 
attracting RE investments in their territory. This fact along with the higher DNI levels in the southern 
AACCs could mainly justify the almost exclusive location of the CSP facilities in these regions.  
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Definitely, the economically unsustainable path of implementation that the CSP has followed in 
Spain has resulted in the application of retroactive measures that have put at risk the viability of the 
facilities in operation. The legal certainty concept itself has been compromised, generating mistrust in 
local and foreign investors. It is expected that the lessons extracted from the thorough analysis of the 
CSP trajectory in Spain could be useful for those countries undertaking the path of CSP or other RES 
technologies promotion. 
 
Acronyms 
AET    Average Electricity Tariff 
AACC    Autonomous Community or Region 
BOE     Official State Bulletin  
BPS     Basis Points 
CNMC     National Commission of Markets and Competition  
CPI     Consumer Price Index 
CSP     Concentrating Solar Power 
DNI   Direct Normal Irradiation 
EU    European Union 
FIT    Feed-in-tariff 
IRR    Internal Rate of Return  
MENA    Middle East and North Africa 
PER     Renewable Energy Plan 
RD    Royal Decree 
30 
 
RDL    Royal Decree-Law  
RE    Renewable Energy 
RES     Renewable Energy Sources 
RPAR     Register of Pre-Allocation of Remuneration 
SR    Special Regime 
USA    United States of America 
 
Variables 
Pinvestment  the cumulative capacity of the CSP projects in the investment stage 
 Pawarded   the cumulative capacity of the CSP projects that got the registration in the RPAR 
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Table 1. Key features of the economic and regulatory framework for CSP in Spain in the period 1998‐2004. Self‐elaboration based on [35,39‐42]. 
Legal Rule  Basic Feature  Power/Energy Targets  Funding System 
Remuneration 
[c€/kWh]  Time Limit 
Annual 
Update  Review 
Fuel Use 
[% electricity 
production] 
Law 54/1997 
Repealed by: 
Law 24/2013 
Redefinition of the SR 
12% of the primary 
energy demand 
reached with RES by 
2010 
n.a.a  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
RD 2818/1998
Amended by: 
RD 1955/2000 
RD 841/2002 
Repealed by: 
RD 436/2004 
Regulatory development of 
the SR 
Group b.1 for solar energy 
12% of the primary 
energy demand 
reached with RES by 
2010 
Premium on top 
of the pool price 
18.0304 
(Pn <5 kW)b 
No  No  Every 4 years  No 
Full price to 
receive 
21.6364 
(Pn > 5 kW) 
PER 2000‐2010
Reviewed by: 
PER 2005‐2010 
Renewable energy plan 
 for 2000‐2010 
200 MW and
 413 GWh/year  
by 2010 of CSP 
As in RD 
2818/1998 
As in RD 
2818/1998 
As in RD 
2818/1998 
As in RD 
2818/1998 
As in RD 
2818/19
98 
As in RD 
2818/1998 
RD 1955/2000
 
Repealed by: 
RD 841/2002 
 
 
Group b.3 for solar thermal 
energy  n.a. 
Premium on top 
of the pool price  3.2755 
No 
According 
to average 
selling 
price of 
electricity 
Every 4 
years  No 
Full price to 
receive  6.7313 
RD 841/2002
Repealed by: 
RD 436/2004 
Subgroup b.1.2 solar 
thermal energy  n.a. 
Premium on top 
of the pool price  12.0202   No  No 
Every 4 
years  Yes 
a: n.a. is the abbreviation for "not addressed" 
b: Pn, nominal or rated power 
 
Table 2. Key features of the economic and regulatory framework for CSP in Spain in the period 2004‐2007. Self‐elaboration based on [36,43,44,47]. 
Legal Rule  Main Characteristics  Power/Energy Targets  Funding System 
Remuneration 
[c€/kWh]  Time Limit 
Annual 
Update  Review 
Fuel Use 
[% electricity 
production] 
RD 436/2004 
Amended by: 
RD 2351/2004 
Repealed by: 
RD 661/2007 
 
Remuneration indexed to 
AET 
200 MW of CSP 
eligible for  
the initial 
remuneration 
Premium on top 
of the pool price 
plus incentive 
250% AET 
plus 10% AET  25 years 
According 
to AET 
In 2006  
 
 Every 4 
years 
 
At 200 
MW 
15% 
200% AET
plus 10% AET  Thereafter 
Regulated tariff 
300% of AET  25 years   
12% with 
restrictions 
 240% of AET  Thereafter 
RD 2351/2004 
Relaxation of 
RD 436/2004 restrictions  
on fuel use 
n.a.a  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Any fuel type 
For HTFb 
temperature 
maintenance 
PER 2005‐2010 
Replaced by: 
PER 2011‐2020 
Review of the previous 
plan for 2000‐2010 
29.4% of electricity 
generation from RES 
by 2010 
 
500 MW and 
1,298 GWh/year 
of CSP by 2010 
As in RD 
436/2004 
As in RD 
436/2004 
As in RD 
436/2004 
As in RD 
436/2004 
As in RD 
436/2004 
As in RD 
2351/2004 
RDL 7/2006 
Remuneration unlinked to 
AET updates 
Remuneration reform 
announced 
n.a. 
As in RD 
2351/2004, 
without AET 
updates 
As in RD 
2351/2004, 
without AET 
updates 
As in RD 
436/2004  No 
As in RD 
436/2004  n.a. 
a: n.a. is the abbreviation for "not addressed" 
b: HTF is the abbreviation for "Heat Transfer Fluid" 
Table 3. Key features of the economic and regulatory framework for CSP in Spain in the period 2007‐2009. Self‐elaboration based on [49]. 
Legal Rule  Basic Feature  Power/Energy Targets  Funding System 
Remuneration 
[c€/kWh]  Time Limit 
Annual 
Update  Review 
Fuel Use 
[% electricity 
production] 
RD 661/2007 
Amended by: 
RD 1565/2010 
RDL 2/2013 
Repealed by: 
RDL 9/2013 
Remuneration unlinked to 
AET 
Fuels and/or technologies 
hybridization 
Adscription to a generation 
control center if Pn>10 MW
20 €/kW guarantee for CSP 
network access 
 
29.4% of electricity 
generation from RES 
by 2010 
 
500 of CSP 
 
Premium on top 
of the pool price  
 
upper limit 
lower limit 
 
 
25.4000 
 
 
34.3976 
25.4038 
25 years 
According 
to CPI 
minus  
25 BPS  
until 2012 
and 50 BPS 
thereafter 
In 2010
 
Every 4 
years 
 
No less  1 
year 
after 
85% (500 
MW) 
15% 
20.3200
  Thereafter 
Regulated tariff  26.9375 25 years 12% 21.5498  Thereafter 
 
Table 4. Key features of the economic and regulatory framework for CSP in Spain in the year 2009, under the RDL 6/2009. Self‐elaboration based on [52]. 
Legal Rule  Basic Feature  Power/Energy Targets  Funding System 
Remuneration 
[c€/kWh]  Time Limit 
Annual 
Update  Review 
Fuel Use 
[% electricity 
production] 
RDL 6/2009 
Repealed by: 
RDL 9/2013 
Compulsory enrolment in 
the RPAR for accessing 
remuneration 
Subject to stringent 
conditions 
Additional 100 €/kW 
guarantee for CSP 
2,440 MW of CSP 
in 4 phases: 
2009‐2012 880,4 MW 
2011‐2012 566,4 MW 
2012 461,2 MW 
2013 481,8 MW  
As in  
RD 661/2007 
As in  
RD 661/2007 
As in RD 
661/2007 
As in RD 
661/2007 
As in RD 
661/2007 
As in  
RD 661/2007 
 
Table 5. Reference equivalent hours/year set by RD 1614/2010 for the different CSP technologies. Self‐
elaboration based on [57]. 
CSP technology  Reference equivalent hours/year 
Parabolic trough without storage 2,855 
Parabolic trough with 9 h storage 4,000 
Parabolic trough with 7 h storage 3,950 
Parabolic trough with 4 h storage 3,450 
Central receiving tower using saturated steam 2,750 
Central tower with molten salt receiver 6,450 
Fresnel  2,450 
Stirling  2,350 
 
Table 6. Key features of the new regulatory elements affecting CSP in Spain in the period 2010‐2013. Self‐elaboration based on [37,55,57‐63,65,66]. 
Legal Rule  Basic Feature  Power/Energy Targets  Funding System 
Remuneration 
[c€/kWh]  Time Limit 
Annual 
Update  Review 
Fuel Use 
[% electricity 
production] 
RD 1565/2010 
Repealed by: 
RD 413/2014 
 
Additional technical 
requirements for SR 
facilities 
Definition of substantial 
modification 
Specific remuneration for 
innovative CSP projects 
80 MW of innovative 
CSP  n.a.
a  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
RD 1614/2010 
Repealed by: 
RD 413/2014 
Limit to the operating 
hours eligible for the 
remuneration 
Pool price plus premium 
eliminated during 12 
months 
n.a.  Regulated tariff of RD 661/2007 
As in regulated 
tariff of  
RD 661/2007 
As in RD 
661/2007 
As in RD 
661/2007 
Review  
for 2010  
deferred 
until 
2012 
15% 
RDL 14/2010 
Charge of 0.5 €/MWh for 
the generated energy  
from January 1, 2011 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Law 2/2011 
Transposition of the 
energy objectives of 
Directive 2009/28/CE  
Set the development of a 
renewable energy plan for 
2011‐2020 
Minimum 20% share 
of RES in the final 
energy consumption 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
PER 2011‐2020  Renewable energy plan for the period 2011‐2020 
3,001 MW and 8,287 
GWh/year of CSP by 
2015  
4,800 MW and 
14,378 GWh/year of 
CSP by 2020 
As in  
RD 661/2007  
until 2013 
As in  
RD 661/2007 
until 2013 
As in RD 
661/2007 
until 2013 
As in RD 
661/2007 
until 2013 
As in RD 
661/2007 
until 2013 
As in 
 RD 661/2007  
until 2013  
RDL 1/2012 
Suppression of RPAR and 
remuneration 
of RD 661/2007 
for new SR facilities 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Law 15/2012 
7% tax on gross revenue
Cancellation of tax 
exemptions for energy 
products in generation   
FIT suppression for 
generation with fuels in 
CSP 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
RDL 29/2012 
Exclusion from the 
remuneration of RD 
661/2007 of  plants not 
completed on time or with 
non‐projected elements  
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
RDL 2/2013 
Partially 
repealed by: 
RD 24/2013 
New index for the 
remuneration update 
Removal of premium on 
top of the pool price 
n.a.  Regulated tariff of RD 661/2007 
As in regulated 
tariff of  
RD 661/2007 
As in RD 
661/2007 
According 
to core 
inflation  
at constant 
taxes 
minus  
50 BPS  
As in RD 
661/2007  n.a. 
RDL 9/2013 
Pool price plus a specific 
remuneration 
providing a reasonable 
return 
n.a. 
Reasonable 
return before 
taxes:  
average yield 
during 
determined 
period of 10‐year 
Spanish bonds in 
the secondary 
market plus a 
differential 
For existing 
facilities: 
 
average yield 
during last 10 
years and  
differential of 
300 BP*S 
(7,395%) 
Regulatory 
lifetime  n.a. 
Every 6 
years  n.a. 
Law 24/2013 
Suppression of SR concept
Regulation of temporary 
closure of facilities 
Regulatory periods  
of 6 years 
Pool price for generation 
from fuels 
n.a.  As in RDL 9/2013 
For new
facilities: 
average yield 
during last 3 
months and  
differential of 
300 BPS
Regulatory 
lifetime  No 
Every 3 
and/or  
6 years 
n.a. 
a: n.a. is the abbreviation for "not addressed" 
 
